Log entry Nº 566 · the stack watch
Bearing W 270° · November 18, 2026 · 4 min read
Marketing PlatformsW 270°Watch log
Optimizely Script Attack Hit 178 Brands, Stole $7,000 in Crypto
Attackers injected malware into 188 Optimizely Web snippets across 178 organizations including HSBC, Salesforce and Ikea, skimming cards and stealing $7,000 in crypto over 17 hours.
By Sophie Lindqvist4 min read739 words

A software supply chain attack on November 16 pushed malicious JavaScript to visitors of 178 organizations' websites, including Salesforce, Zoom, GitLab, Equifax, HSBC, CNN and Ikea — without breaching a single one of those companies. Web security vendor Report URI uncovered the campaign, which weaponized 188 infected Optimizely Web snippets, the testing and optimization tool embedded across enterprise sites.
By 21:52 UTC that day, most of the malicious code was gone; researchers found it lingering in just 1 of the 188 infected snippets. The malware arrived with a valid certificate from Optimizely's own content delivery network, and how the attacker gained write access to unrelated customers' projects remains unclear. TechTarget reached out to Optimizely; no reply by publication.
What did the payload actually do?
Plenty, and none of it friendly. According to Report URI, it:
- Swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses
- Skimmed payment cards
- Stole cookies
- Took screenshots
- Delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits to iPhones and iPads
As of the evening of November 16, the attacker had stolen roughly $7,000 in cryptocurrency from the affected sites' users. A modest haul, all things considered.
"The uncomfortable lesson is that none of the victims were breached," said Scott Helme, the security researcher who discovered the campaign. "Their own infrastructure was untouched; a vendor's script turned hostile and their sites served it to every visitor."
Why the visible figure understates the damage
Peter Lowe, threat research lead at threat intelligence vendor ZeroFox, put the $7,000 in perspective. "But money is only the part we can count," he cautioned. "Non-HttpOnly cookies, card details typed into sites' own forms rather than a hosted payment frame, and the iOS exploit chains served to anyone on an unpatched iPhone are all impacts nobody can measure from the outside."
Lowe advised organizations to audit code that incorporates JavaScript or other third-party assets, then set up monitoring. Optimizely Web customers should "check the Project JavaScript yourself and rotate everything that can write to it — users, tokens, integrations," he said.
The lesson for CISOs: third-party scripts don't deserve unconditional trust. When it runs on your page and skims your customer's card, it's your breach, not your vendor's — a point George Gerchow, IANS faculty member and CSO at Bedrock Data, made bluntly. Every company running third-party scripts should know which ones execute on login and payment pages, lock down where that code can send data, and get alerted the minute a script changes.
"This one ran for about 17 hours on some of the biggest sites in the world," Gerchow said.
Does self-hosting fix anything?
Not really. Helme found that some victims served Optimizely's snippet from their own domains and were still infected, because they proxied the live file. Your origin, their poison.
"The practical starting point is a Content Security Policy (CSP) in report-only mode," Lowe said. "It breaks nothing; it just has every visitor's browser tell you what loaded and where data went, and you end up with an inventory built from real traffic rather than a spreadsheet from 2023."
Most affected organizations lacked a CSP or monitoring capable of catching the attack, Helme noted. He and Lowe recommended alerts for unexpected new scripts, changes to trusted files, and data flowing to new destinations. CSP reporting would have flagged the fetch and sendBeacon requests the skimmer used to exfiltrate data.
Caveats apply. Report URI found that a CSP blocked the external payload on HSBC's sites, but an inline copy still ran because the policy allowed eval. Helme's advice: push back on vendors that require 'unsafe-eval', or isolate them. And trim the script inventory on payment and login pages.
"An A/B testing tool rarely needs to be on a checkout or account page at all," he said. "'Trusted' should mean 'allowed to do these specific things,' not 'allowed to do anything.'"
Speed matters too. The incident ran from about 4 a.m. UTC until cleanup around 9 p.m., so a report on Friday wouldn't have been much good, Lowe noted. Gerchow predicted the next wave will target enterprise AI agents: "The plugin or MCP server you trusted yesterday is the delivery channel tomorrow, and an agent will run whatever it's handed."
The real question, per Lowe, isn't whether you trust your third parties. It's whether you'd notice if one quietly changed overnight.
Plot points
- On Nov 16, attackers infected 188 Optimizely Web snippets belonging to 178 organizations, including Salesforce, HSBC and Ikea.
- The attacker stole about $7,000 in cryptocurrency before cleanup; most code was removed by 21:52 UTC after roughly 17 hours.
- The payload skimmed payment cards, stole cookies, swapped crypto wallet addresses and served iOS exploit kits Coruna and DarkSword.
- A CSP in report-only mode and rotation of all write access — users, tokens, integrations — are the recommended first steps.
via techtarget.com (Source)
More from Sophie Lindqvist
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Senior reporter covering companies, deals and strategy in marketing technology at Martech Beacon.
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