Log entry Nº 456 · the stack watch

Bearing S 180° · November 18, 2026 · 4 min read

Marketing PlatformsS 180°Watch log

Optimizely Confirms Supply-Chain Attack: Malware Hit 178 Customer Sites

Attackers abused a flaw in Optimizely's Experimentation signup flow to inject card-skimming malware into 178 trusted customer sites, including HSBC, Zoom, IKEA and Costco.

By Rebecca Stone4 min read865 words

Optimizely confirms massive cyberattack on customer websites injected stealer malware
Fix Nº 456Optimizely confirms massive cyberattack on customer websites injected stealer malware — TheDigitalWay / pixabay

At least 178 websites — including properties belonging to Zoom, HSBC, IKEA, Starbucks and Equifax — were infected with stealer malware through Optimizely's Web Experimentation platform. UK security researcher Scott Helme, founder of Report URI, confirmed the victim count. He warned it could rise.

"That's the number that we directly observed and that all carried the same infection," Helme said in an interview after publishing his report on Monday.

The named victim list spans vendors and end-user enterprises alike: Paychex, Equifax, GitLab, Starbucks, IKEA, Mattel, American Eagle, Air France, Mutual of Omaha, Heineken, Home Chef, Cinnabon, Levi's, Costco and HSBC. Salesforce issued a statement confirming it too was hit.

"Salesforce is investigating unauthorized modifications to scripts provided by Optimizely and used on certain Salesforce websites," the company wrote in an email statement. "As a precaution, Salesforce is confirming that Optimizely scripts are disabled across preview and production instances."

How did the attack work?

Optimizely customers load a JavaScript snippet from the vendor's CDN onto their sites. That snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's A/B tests, and an optional field called Project JavaScript holding customer-written custom code. Attackers exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow, impersonated a user, and leveraged a capability for adding members to a site's development team to insert their own code into the Project JavaScript field.

They left the rest of each snippet untouched. "The file was still served from cdn.Optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted," the report noted.

The payload was a multi-purpose kit. "It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits," Helme wrote. "The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached."

The script watched form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a card number, expiry date and CVV. Once it captured all three, it sent them to a hardcoded collection domain using navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes such as Stripe and Adyen were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

What does Optimizely say it fixed?

Optimizely, which did not reply to an interview request, confirmed the attacks on its status page. In an email to customers, the company said attackers "exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow. They used it to impersonate a user and add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. We have blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix."

The company also said it had ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts, removed the injected code from affected projects, and blocked any code from being delivered in Cloudflare. Its wording was emphatic: "the Optimizely Experimentation platform is fully secured" and "modification of Javascript no longer possible."

Frank Dickson, principal analyst at Dickson Research, pushed back on that confidence. He flagged a timeline discrepancy: Optimizely put the first malicious write at 07:51, while Report URI saw the BBC's Optimizely snippet loading attacker code at 04:21 — three and a half hours earlier. "The forensics report should reconcile that gap. Customers need the real start time to scope their exposure," Dickson said.

He added: "Optimizely seems very comfortable stating absolutes early in a forensics investigation. Those are verdicts from a company whose forensics are still underway and whose timeline disagrees with outside research."

Who was behind it?

Helme speculated the attackers were a small group of thieves, almost certainly operating from China. He cited extensive Chinese writing in the code and infrastructure previously used by other Chinese actors. "They are either Chinese or they really want us to think that they are Chinese," he said.

He doubted state involvement. State actors, he argued, would have deployed the malware on major news sites to create and spread false stories. He also could not yet verify Optimizely's claim of a fix. Some infected sites were cleaned up, but he must wait to see whether they get reinfected before concluding the original hole was closed.

What does this change for martech practitioners?

One line in Optimizely's customer email drew particular concern from Dickson. Optimizely's documentation tells customers to allow 'unsafe-eval' in their Content Security Policy. At HSBC, the policy blocked the main payload and the data theft — but a backup copy of the malicious code ran anyway through that setting.

"A vendor's setup guide should not quietly loosen its customers' defenses," Dickson said. His prescription for practitioners: "Restrict script-src to the hosts a page actually needs. Lock down connect-src so stolen data has nowhere to go. Drop 'unsafe-eval' wherever possible. Start in report-only mode so nothing breaks."

His bottom line was blunt. "The Optimizely attack may be about as bad as a third-party script compromise gets. Optimizely owes its customers a clear explanation of how one flaw reached so many unrelated companies."

Plot points

  1. At least 178 sites were infected with stealer malware via Optimizely Web Experimentation, discovered by researcher Scott Helme.
  2. Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable signup-flow path, revoked tokens, removed injected code and blocked delivery in Cloudflare.
  3. The malware skimmed card numbers, CVVs and expiry dates, swapped crypto wallet addresses and delivered iOS exploit kits.
  4. Analyst Frank Dickson flagged a 3.5-hour gap between Optimizely's timeline (07:51) and Report URI's observation (04:21).

via cio.com (Source)

Filed under

  • optimizely
  • supply-chain-attack
  • web-security
  • javascript-malware
  • a-b-testing
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Rebecca Stone

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Staff writer covering companies, deals and strategy in marketing technology at Martech Beacon.

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